A Behavioral Theory of the Firm by James March and Richard Cyert is one of the most influential works in organizational science. An interesting and important element of that work was a computational model of a duopoly, which was eliminated in the second edition of the book. We examine the structure of the model and illustrate how the theoretical constructs were implemented: organizational attention, organizational learning, organizational memory, routines and meta-routines, and computational experiments. We also explore the academic environment within which this theory and model grew. We suggest that an interesting question is why the theory had a distinctly greater impact than the method on organizational research and education.
mechanisms are of interest today: organizational routines, organizational attention, organizational memory, and organizational learning. Fourth, it was decidedly an interdisciplinary theory, crossing boundaries and integrating constructs from economics, administrative behavior, social psychology, cognitive psychology, and (what was to become) computer science. Finally, the fact that the model was crafted as a computer program, a computational model if you will, tied to a particular theory and used to conduct a series of computational studies was remarkably innovative. But was it influential?
To understand the context of the model, we first provide an examination of the background context for the model -the Graduate School of Industrial Administration (GSIA) at Carnegie Tech, circa the late 1950s and 1960s.
1 Who was there at the time? What were they doing? What was the culture? What was special about the zeitgeist at GSIA that supported the melding of a variety of disciplines into a theory that, in part, could be instantiated in a computer model? Next we briefly examine two influential elements at GSIA and across Carnegie Tech at the time regarding the use of computers. We then turn to the theory itself. We do not present the details of the theory per se, but rather focus on elements of the theory that were realized in the coded model. This section, necessarily, forms the bulk of the paper. We conclude with a summarizations of the innovative elements of the model and speculate on how this model has (and has not) impacted research in organizational science.
The Zeitgeist at GSIA Business schools in America were originally not considered as serious participants in the world of academic scholarship and intellectual pursuits. They often defined their role primarily in terms of codifying and communicating good business practice, as exemplified by business case writing and teaching. Indeed, many early faculty positions were filled with experienced businessmen (e.g., Arthur Andersen) rather than young scholars. Despite the efforts of some deans and faculty to migrate towards more academic pursuits, the schools emphasized practical, not theoretical courses; applied, not basic science; and the contributions of faculty were more often publishing in practitioner magazines than in academic journals. Herbert Simon, who contributed substantially to the change in American business schools, noted in his autobiography: "Accurately or not, we perceived American business education at that time as a wasteland of vocationalism that needed to be transformed into science-based professionalism, as medicine and engineering had been transformed a generation or two earlier." (Simon, 1991, p. 138 ).
The early post-war period was a period that saw the glorification of big science (Leslie, 1993; Zachary, 1999) . Social and behavioral sciences became more quantitative, more analytical, and more committed to scientific principles. A report by Robert Gordon at
Berkeley and James Howell at Stanford defined a watershed in business education when it advocated the adoption of analytical approaches to management education. Spurred by this study --called the Gordon-Howell Report - (Gordon & Howell, 1959) , the Ford Foundation dedicated more than 35 million dollars during the 1960s to successful efforts to reform business schools (Schlossman, Sedlak & Wechsler, 1987) .
The Ford Foundation had at that time formulated a program for 'the study of man'
(which became known as 'the behavioral science research area') the specific objective of which was stated as follows: "The Ford Foundation will support scientific activities designed to increase knowledge of factors which influence or determine human conduct, and to extend such knowledge for the maximum benefit of individuals and of society". 2 Research had to be scientific; embodied in the Ford Foundation's understanding of the behavioral science concept was "its emphasis upon the scientific approach to problem solution" (p. 4).
And it had to be practical, to some extend at least, given the foundation's interest not in knowledge per se, but in "knowledge which promises at some point to serve human needs".
Furthermore, it explicitly encouraged interdisciplinary research. "The program is interdisciplinary and inter-field. Its goal is to acquire and apply knowledge of human behavior, and segments of all fields and disciplines will make contributions in varying degrees".
Carnegie Mellon University (then the Carnegie Institute of Technology) through its
Graduate School of Industrial Administration became the role model for a research based, disciplinary oriented (but very interdisciplinary) approach to business education and an invigoration of fundamental interdisciplinary research in accounting, finance, marketing, operations research, microeconomics, and organizations. Organizations (March & Simon, 1958) and A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert & March, 1963) are two significant results of the early work on business research at Carnegie. In addition to filling a need in the establishment of the behavioral sciences, research on organizations became the emergent discipline of business school education, bringing together different disciplines in the study of decision-making and behavior in organizations.
It was the image of the Ford Foundation's behavioral vision that Herbert Simon, one of the first to arrive at the Carnegie campus, had in mind when forming the GSIA group. As a result, he hired young faculty with similar interests who had the technical skills, but also a broader knowledge in social science. In addition to James March, we find among his hires Harold Guetzkow, Charles Holt, Jack Muth and Allen Newell. The group at Carnegie soon consisted of many talented young scholars who were all eager to contribute to this newly formed vision of behavioral science. The spirit at Carnegie was such that everybody interacted with everybody else; discussing each others' ideas and research in a way that encouraged collaborative teams to work together, as well as across projects. Despite different disciplines, interests and despite different disciplines and despite varying degrees of admiration for the idea of rationality, these teams always worked together in a friendly way.
For instance, while much of Simon's research centered around bounded rationality, the work of Franco Modigliani had a high rational component to it. Regardless of the differences in their intellectual models, they respected each other worked well together, since at Carnegie, intellectual curiosity and dedication was highly appreciated and mattered more than disciplinary boundaries. This interdisciplinary, yet disciplined, way of working because pioneering for subsequent developments in economics -and spurred the development of entirely new areas of interdisciplinary research on organizations and organizational decision making.
It was a business school, but they thought of themselves as reforming economics. In keeping with this, and with spirit of the Ford Foundation emphasis, the two major projects,
Organizations and A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, sought to integrate economics ideas with those coming from the more soft disciplines of sociology and social psychology. Some of the early projects included a study done for the Controllership Foundation on the comparative merits of decentralization and centralization in budgeting, a study for the Office of Naval
Research on uncertainty and decision making, and an "inventory" of organization theory funded by the Ford Foundation, which led to the book Organizations, co-authored by March and Simon with the assistance of Harold Guetzkow (Simon, 1991) .
The projects organizations and behavioral theory of the firm were particularly important, filling a need in the establishment of the behavioral sciences. Moreover, research on organizations became the emergent discipline of business school education, bringing together different disciplines in the study of decision making and behavior in organizations.
It furthermore significantly influenced major developments in (organizational) economics, in This was all part of the early mission that GSIA had to integrate behavioral social science it into the problems of the theory of business firms and decision making in organizations. The administrative strategy was detailed in 1953. 3 Finding that the GSIA provided an "especially appropriate environment for [organizational] research", the early GSIA scholars, including Cooper and Simon were ready to identify research problems in this area that needed intensive work and also to conduct empirical studies of business organizations in order to give the methodological discussions a more concrete and tangible focus, and to outline a long term research program into organizational behavior.
It comes as no surprise that the initial approach of the research program came from the theoretical framework developed in Simon's earlier work, in particular Administrative
Behavior (Simon, 1947) . Following the decision making framework from the dissertation, then, Simon wanted the central concern of the organizational research program to be "how people in organizations, particularly at supervisory and executive levels, make choices among alternative courses of action, and how organizational changes affect their choices", the general hypothesis of the research program being that organizations influence individual behavior by providing an important part of the environment in which they have to make decisions (p. 2-3). And in order to understand such decisions, one must examine and understand not only the characteristics of the decision maker and his relations to the groups, organizations and institutions with which he has daily contact; but also the environment constituted by interactions within the whole business organizations. Thus, the "research will focus on the specific set of influences that we would describe as 'the organization' rather than on either the broader social influences or the narrower small-group and individual influences" (p. 3).
Given this focus, three aspects of the organizational decision making processes in particular deserved attention. First, it was important to understand the roles of formal and informal organizational aspects, and the interaction between them, both with regard to the communication channels through which decision premises are transmitted, and with regard to the development of attributes of the decision premises, such as legitimacy, loyalty, goals, identification, and so forth. The main idea here was that formal organizational influences were significant in establishing initial conditions in organizations which in turn may determine possible equilibria of the system of organizational interactions. Second, relations between decision making processes and learning had to be explored. Because of bounded rationality, decision makers see only part of the world and they simplify their decision situation to simpler situations which then serves as their frames of reference. Finding an intimate connection between organizational structure and the learning of frames of references and roles by organizational members, the relationship was seen to be going both ways (Cyert & March, 1963) . This work extended the earlier ideas, particularly by elaborating concepts of organizational slack, adaptive aspirations, organizational learning, and the role of rules and routines. The book furthermore addressed a major dilemma of organization theory: the choice between a realistic, but unmanageable theoretical model of organization, and a simple, manageable. Using computer simulations, a relatively realistic description of actual processes was sought, without losing the predictive power so essential to empirical testing (Cyert, Feigenbaum & March, 1959 Simon were well entrenched in artificial intelligence and simulating cognitive processes (e.g., Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1958a; Newell & Simon, 1961) and working on their theory of problem solving (Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1958b) . 7 Worked progressed on GPS (General Problem Solver) to solve a variety of problems, such as the Tower of Hanoi, theorem proving, the Water-Jugs problem, sentence processing, and the Bridges of Königsberg (Ernst & Newell, 1969) . GPS was actually written in a language developed at Carnegie Tech called
IPL-V, a list processing language whose development team included Fred Tonge and Ed
Feigenbaum (Newell & Tonge, 1960) , 1957-1958, p. 1 ). An element of this concern was a recurring one: teaching theory versus practice. One consequence was the Carnegie Tech Management Game. 7 At that time they also developed the "Logic Theorist" which is regarded as the first artificial intelligence program, which was able to discover proofs to theorems in symbolic logic (Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1957) and participated in the famous Dartmouth Conference of 1956 that brought together the leading researchers of artificial intelligence at the time and was, in fact, the place the term "artificial intelligence" was actually coined. Harold Leavitt, Jim March, and Herb Simon. Accordingly, the game was unique not only in its design and complexity (as a computer model), but also in its integration into the curriculum with a board of directors to which each team/firm must report and a vehicle for research (see Cohen et al., 1960) . When the first version of the Management Game was to be revised in 1961, it was rewritten in another language being developed at Carnegie Tech at the time for the Bendix G-20 computer, called GATE (GATE, 1962) . Cohen, now a faculty member at GSIA, again assisted in this programming task, learning GATE. By that time the game administration responsibilities shifted to Merton Miller (1960 -1961 and then to Peter Winters (1961 Winters ( -1962 , who oversaw the reimplementation of the game coding to GATE.
As the Behavioral Theory of the Firm project proceeded, Professor Cohen added substantially to the role of computer models in economics, business research and education.
When the ABTOF model was eventually written, it was written in GATE and Professor
"brutal" board of directors meetings and labor negotiations. In 1963 by the Carnegie Stock Exchange was developed which provided a market in which Carnegie faculty and students could trade shares of the Management Game firms.
Cohen helped Peer Soelberg (who received his Ph.D. from GSIA in 1967) develop the code on the Bendix G-20.
As one can imagine, the Bendix computer was quite limited. 9 More to the point, the code itself is not that intuitive (compared to current languages) and was more than likely understood by few readers. 10 For example, consider a small code fragment (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 187) When the book appeared in 1963, the listing of the duopoly model in Chapter 8 was a listing of one of the runs on the Bendix. 11 The theory was now in the code.
The Theory in the Code
Besides reading the original(s), a good and brief summary of the general theory can be found in Engwall and Danell (2002) , but our goal here is to summarize aspects of the theory that are relevant to the computational model itself. Recall that the theory is primarily a descriptive theory, viewing the firm as a complex collective and not as a unified individual 9 Consider that the basic central processing unit (cabinet) had a main memory of 4,000 words (i.e., 4k, 32 bits each) up to 32k words, weighed about 2,000 pounds, had about 8,900 (non-integrated) transistors, and cost $290,000. Today's desktop Athlon 64 FX-53 has a main memory support of 1 Terabyte (trillion), has about 106 million transistors (integrated), used 64-bit words, can fit in your hand, and costs about $700. 10 This is not to say that the program was obfuscated, but simply the language itself (GATE) was not that familiar. 11 The code and the model did not appear in the 2 nd edition. This (and other adjustments) were made to streamline the book and "did not reflect any discovery of problems with the model or disenchantment" (Jim March, personal communication, March 11, 2005) . A translation of the model is available from the authors.
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entrepreneur. This was, in part, a response to the inadequacies of conventional economic theory to address certain questions about internal allocation of resources and processes of economic decisions, as well as a response to the inadequacies of existing organizational theories to provide a basis for an integrated theory of the firm that sufficiently accommodates key internal economic decisions or external market conditions. 12 Accordingly, the mission for the theory was described (Cyert & March, 1963) :
Our conception of the task we face is that of constructing a theory that takes
(1) the firm as its basic unit, (2) the prediction of firm behavior with respect to such decisions as price, output, and resource allocation as its objective,
and (3) an explicit emphasis on the actual process of organizational decision making as its basic research commitment. (p. 19)
But more was needed. Cyert and March believed that the firm was the basic unit for the theory, but decision strategies or rules (i.e., routines) were the basic units for describing processes within the firm. To Cyert and March, organizations could be viewed as dynamic, adapting, information-processing systems, so they noted that they needed additional subtheories to complete the story. The subtheories essentially described a framework for analysis providing a language for representing (1) the core variables of merit 13 that reflect primary constructs of the theory and the sets of ancillary variables that affect those constructs and (2) a set of relational concepts affording mechanisms for accommodating the consequences of plurality and bounded rationality. Together, these provide a basis for 12 Although substantial criticism of the conventional theory of the firm assumptions were well underway (e.g., Gordon, 1948; Margolis, 1958; Simon, 1952) , Cyert and March (1963) noted that, with regard to the conventional theory, "…there are a number of important and interesting questions relating specifically to firm behavior that the theory cannot answer and was never developed to answer, especially with regard to the internal allocation of resources and the process of setting prices and outputs" (p. 15) in terms of "microbehaviors" (p. 99) that are substantially influenced by psychological principles. 13 The use of the term "variable" was not meant to be an explicit mathematical or computational concept, but an organizational construct that would account for a particular form of variation and influence -it is a form of a representational system (i.e., variable concepts, relational concepts). However, the translation to a computational form is straight-forward.
describing how economic decisions are made when incorporating organizational concepts.
We will explore the relevant aspects of this framework that are relevant to the computational model.
Core Variable Categories
There are three core variable categories defined by the framework: organizational goals, organizational expectations, and organizational choice. The specific variables will not be discussed here, but will emerge in the subsequent discussion of the model. In general, there are two questions that will (eventually) be addressed for each category: What are the variables under discussion? How are they used to implement organizational constructs?
Organizational Goal
The concept of an organizational goal embodies the theoretical exposition of how coalitions of individuals formulate, maintain, and adjust goals (and the factors that influence them) and aspirations over time. Consequently, there is no single organizational goal, but several goals that are addressed with varying degrees of independence and may, in fact, be incommensurable for specific aspiration levels set by the respective coalition.
In the Code. Table 1 shows the five goals used in C-M and additionally the price decision, and how the goal, aspiration level, and achievement level information are shared across goal contexts.
Insert Table 1 about here Within the discussion of goals, we see the formulation of several insightful concepts:
organizational memory (which we will see later), tacit knowledge, organizational attention, and organizational slack. Cyert and March argue that, ceteris paribus, coalition goals (and the structures that emerge to achieve them) are relatively stable over time and embody (sometimes tacit) knowledge of their formulation:
14
Whether precedents are formalized in the shape of an official standard operating procedure or are less formally stored, they remove from conscious consideration many agreements, decisions, and commitments that might well be subject to renegotiation in an organizational without memory. (p. 33)
Although the goals and the structure that realizes them may not change over (shortrun) time, the aspiration levels for the goal within a coalition will change, depending on achievement and events. However, it is also interesting to note that Cyert and March propose that there are mechanisms that account for the shifting of organizational attention between goals. The capacity to shift attention affords (as we shall see) two benefits:
conservation of attentional and decision making resources (including informational and temporal), and tolerance for conflicting goals.
In the Code. A good example of shifting attention is found in the routines that examine whether the profit goal (PFG) is met. Consider the following abstracted code segment (Code 2):
15
Revision of the profit goal is based on a weighted average between the prior profit goal (PFG t-1 ) and the profit actually earned (Profit). When profit consistently exceeds the profit goal, the attention is gradually shifted to provide more importance to recent (successful) performance (Profit), than to the profit goal itself, by increasing the local parameter β 1 . On the other hand, failing to meet the profit goal results in attention being 14 Reorganization and renegotiation costs in time and effort; therefore, the immediate past forms a guide and precedent for the future affording decreased effort in deliberation by the coalition and, consequently, increased stability. This also explains, as they note, how the "accidents" of organizational genealogy tend to be perpetrated (p. 34). 15 We will not use GATE code, but interpret the GATE code and use a more strurctured pseudo-code language for illustrative purposes. Each example will be noted by the identifier [Code i] in the upper right corner of the code box.
shifted away from recent successes by reducing β 1 . (We will explore β 2 later.) Thus, β 1 serves as an "attention parameter" that is biased by prior success (or failures).
Finally, they introduce the concept of organizational slack. In general, organizational slack is described as "payments to members of the coalition in excess of what is required to maintain the organization" (p. 36). Cyert and March proceed to explain the concept.
In conventional economic theory slack is zero (at least at equilibrium). In treatments of managerial economics, attention is ordinarily focused on only one part of slack -payments to owners -and it is assumed that other slack is maintained at zero. Neither view is an especially accurate portrayal of an actual firm. (p. 37)
Thus slack as presented in the theory reflects an aggregated organizational construct (as it has many forms and contexts) and affords a mechanism for firms to respond to "gross shifts in the external environment" (p. 37). It is important to note that the construct of slack is not consciously addressed, so there are no decision rules that examine slack; rather, slack changes are a consequence of decisions and events, and these end effect of the changes can come from a wide variety of sources beyond simple payments. Slack relates to organizational goals as it is adjusted in response to performance (resulting from activity with the external environment) with respect to goals. As a consequence, it serves as both a stabilizing and adaptive role in two ways:
(1) by absorbing excess resources, it retards upward adjustment of aspirations during relatively good times; (2) by providing a pool of emergency resources, it permits aspirations to be maintained (and achieved) during relatively bad times. (p. 38)
In the Code. There are two representations for slack in the model: general organizational slack (Org_Slack) and sales slack (Sales_Slack). The former directly impacts unit costs (higher organizational slack results in higher unit costs) while the latter directly impacts both market share (market share is reduced by sales slack) and demand (demand is reduced by sales slack). The two forms of slack absorb the various specific formulations of slack-like behaviors in an organization. Slack levels are influenced differently in different contexts and there is no overall "monitoring" of slack; that is, results of local decisions influence slack accumulations. Table 2 shows the types of events that influence slack.
Insert Table 2 The firm has the following knowledge (albeit sometimes lagged) about the environment: competitor's price (and price behavior); its own sales (as response by the market to relative price and sales pressures); its own (consequent) market share; and its own exogenous costs (for the current and prior periods). Figure 1 presents an abstract representation of the information in the external environment to which the firm attends, the expectations influenced by that information, and 16 In their discussion of expectations, Cyert and March discuss an aspect of organizational decision making that would eventually become woven into the well-known garbage can model (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972) : "Many of the events in these studies suggest a mating theory of search. Not only are organizations looking for alternatives; alternatives are looking for organizations." (p. 80) the goals influenced by those expectations. As can be seen, the four primary expectations are sales forecast, estimated cost, estimated revenue, and estimated profit. The critical decision variable in the model is price. It is interesting to note that, because of the local information and timings, there are specific limits to where expectations reach. For example, neither the sales goal nor the profit goal are directly influenced by current or prior sales forecasts; rather, sales forecasts are primarily used for production-inventory estimates.
Therefore, there are restrictions on communication of information as many expectations are driven by local considerations; however, there is information (though possibly lagged), decisions (as expectations) and signals (of events) that are shared or propagated across coalition boundaries both directly and indirectly.
In the Code. The market share goal presents such an example. Rather than directly being incorporated into a routine that modifies either the goal or the price directly, relative performance of the market share goal can generate a signal to the pricing department routines. Consider a fragment of a routine (Code 3) that examines performance with respect to Market Share goal (MSGoal) and Sales goal (SalesGoal).
In this routine, the primary purpose is to adjust the Market Share goal, depending on its immediate success (or failure). However, the firm has adapted a special component to the routine that, under certain circumstances (i.e., both the Sales and the Market Share goals were not met), causes it to search to check whether the competition has recently cut prices.
If they have, then an appropriate signal is sent to the Pricing department routines.
Consequently, specific and limited search is conducted, information is filtered and externally to the routines) and parameters for the sets of routines associated with the goals and price decisions. As will be noted, the parameters play a key role in organizational adaptation and instantiating local biases in decisions.
Insert Table 3 about here Choice is demanded in response to a problem, which is defined in terms of the organizational goals and expectations. Virtually every suite of routines first tests whether the aspiration levels have been met or not, though not all routines attend to all goals (see prior Thus, organizational learning is central to the theory and the concept of organizational learning was highly influenced by Simon's concept of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957 (Simon, , 1956 . 17 Cyert and March explicitly note that "the theory outlined in this volume characterizes the firm as an adaptively rational system rather than an omnisciently rational system" (p. 99). In this theory, they were quite explicit about the time frame and extent of adaptation they were addressing. The unit of adaptation, in a fundamental sense, was the routine or standard operating procedure, which was to be considered invariant over the time frame they proposed (a few years):
From this point of view, standard operating procedures should be on of the major objects for study by students of organizational decision making. The result of adaptation rather than adaptation itself can be studied. (p. 101)
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In summary, organizational choice involves variables that influence the definition of what constitutes a problem, the variables that influence the organizational routines (as we shall see, generally forms of past experience, slack, and local information), and the variables that influence the order of consideration for the alternatives (generally where in the organization the problem resides and the past experience within that context). For examining organizational choice over short-term time frames, the structures of the standard operating procedures are to be considered stable.
Major Relational Concepts
Cyert and March add four major relational concepts to the theory: quasi-resolution of conflict, uncertainty avoidance, problemistic search, and organizational learning.
Quasi-resolution of conflict
Quasi-resolution of conflict reflects the unresolved state of goal conflict (and resource competition) between coalitions. As the ABTOF articulates the firm as a coalition of members (who may also be coalitions) having differing goals, there is a lack of an overarching universally defined (or accepted) organizational goal. Furthermore, the 18 Cyert and March certainly appreciated the importance of studying adaptation and their model specifically indicated the units of adaptation (i.e., routines), but the argued "since little or no research has been carried out on organizational learning [referring to changes in decision rules as was viewed as the primary consequence of adaptation], the assumptions are borrowed from the study of other adaptive systems and have only limited prima facie validity" (p. 101). In fact, they describe the simple form it can take: hierarchies of rules, where upper level rules (more general and sensitive to feedback over longer time periods) can change lower level rules (more specific and sensitive to feedback over shorter intervals). They proceed by conceptualizing and discussing two extreme levels of abstraction: general (articulating general properties of simplicity, stability, and certainty) and specific (articulating different types, such as task performance and information handling routines).
preferences of the coalitions may be incommensurable with any specified organizational objective function, thus creating conflicting goal aspiration levels. Conflict, in the sense used by ABTOF, arises in a firm when the aspiration level of one goal (e.g., market share) may interfere with the achievement of the aspiration level of another goal (e.g., profit). Despite recent economic formulations on how to resolve or address such disparate preferences or goals, empirical observations, as well as conventional wisdom, underscore the likelihood of continued unresolved within-firm conflict.
Unresolved, however, does not mean unaddressed. Latent goal conflict can and does exist without significant disruptive effects to the organization as goals are considered as relatively independent constraints. The reason for this is that conflict is structurally and temporally accommodated by four (not unrelated) mechanisms: goals as independent constraints, local rationality, sequential attention to goals, and satisficing routines.
Goals as Independent Constraints. This is realized simply by establishing not one, but several goals that are active in the decision model. Furthermore, these goals are addressed relatively independently as a nearly decomposable system with minimal cross communication of either aspiration values or goal achievement status (see Table 1 ).
Local Rationality. Local rationality reflects the inclination of subunits to employ macro-routines (routines that embody other routines) that address a limited, locally defined, and limited set of decisions. The suites of routines that handle these goals and price decision are for the most part independent and rely on differing information, with some crosscommunication on events and states (see Table 2 ).
Sequential Attention to Goals. However, all goals are not simultaneously considered; rather, they are sequentially addressed. This not only lessens the general computational and information demands required to consider the five goals jointly, but also addresses the realistic situation where the aspiration levels are set independently and may be incommensurable. Further, some goals are examined only after a lag period.
In the Code. We can see these there constructs embodied in the top-level control for the program (Code 4). There is a sequential attention to specific goals, with some temporal lags, usually addressed by routines that rely on limited global information and influenced by local parameters (see table 3 ).
Satisficing Routines. The routines and decision rules implemented to achieve a particular goal are generally internally consistent (to the routine), but in fact to do not presume to reflect attempts at achievements of local optima. Rather, the set of routines address local decisions (many times dominated by local data) en route to their decisions regarding aspiration levels. In C-M, local internal parameters (each with a particular distribution of values) serve as sources of decision variance in the components of the routines. 
Uncertainty Avoidance
Organizations face uncertainty on a variety of fronts (internal and external), and deal with it in a diversity of forms. In actuality, organizations exhibit explicit strategies that avoid uncertainty. The C-M incorporates uncertainty avoidance by (a) using routines which focus on short-run decision horizons, (b) using routines which are react to problems arising from short-run feedback events, (c) stabilizing the routines used for (a) and (b).
In the Code. An example of uncertainty avoidance via routines with short-run horizons is demonstrated by how C-M handles the production level decisions (Code 5).
Rather than rely on intricate, long-term projections of sales or inventory, the sales forecast is a simple weighted average of the actual sales and sales forecast of the prior period, and the inventory model is simply the available inventory if sales projections are met. The horizon is the next period, and the uncertainty encountered is accommodated by the adapted routines and their adjustment parameters.
For many problems, the firm in the C-M has adapted a set of routines to handle the normal variance in behavior. Typically, the context is restricted to the determination of the aspiration level for the particular goal (e.g., production levels, sales, market share) with the set of local parameters and information. However, a second example of illustrates how short-term events combined with a specific problem context (i.e., aspiration level failure) can cause signaling across normal routine goal context boundaries.
Thus, uncertainty is avoided by the routines of C-M in two general ways. First, the fundamental nature of the suite of adapted routines associated with the determination of an aspiration level affords a "first-level" adapted form. These routines rely on short-term data, and handle fluctuations in uncertainty either by adjusting local parameter values, or by engaging alternative sequences of decision strategies. Second, routines may detect, but not address, problems in the short-run. Rather, they signal problem existence to other routines.
Those other routines also rely on simply decision rules, short-run data, and local information.
Problemistic Search
Search in the ABTOF refers to the firm's attempts at finding a solution to a problem. The implication is that the "normal" suite of routines has not been able to sufficiently attenuate the problem situation, so alternative measures must be taken. Although the firm in the C-M has a set of possible solutions identified as the search space, there is uncertainty as to which solution is appropriate in a given problem context. As a consequence, an explicit decision rule cannot be articulated mapping problem situations to explicit decision rules. Therefore, the firm explores potential solutions as the need arises.
In the Code. In the C-M, search is embedded in the routines that handle aspects of the pricing decision. Specifically, search occurs under the following three circumstances following a failure to achieve profit goal aspirations: when the sales routines signal a normal request for a price change; when sales routines signal an emergency request (i.e., reflecting a competitor's recent price change); and, when exogenous costs have increased and there has not been a price change in some periods. The search itself, as a routine, is a set of six alternatives as shown in Code 6.
Thus, these are not actually new solutions, as they all have been incorporated in other routines; for the firm, the set of possible solutions are therefore set. What this search routine does is try to link these solutions to those conditions that are not yet sufficiently addressed by the other routines. When "all else" fails (in the conditions described above), search of these alternatives will ensue.
Organizational Learning
Organizational learning is a generic and ill-defined phrase enjoying a recent resurgence in organizational science. Cyert and March (1963) In the Code. Goal adaptation for the Profit, Sales, and Market Share are in the same general form: G t = f(G t-1 ,P t-1 ,d), where G t-1 is the prior aspiration level, P t-1 is prior performance associated with the aspiration level, and d is the parameter which alters the weight placed on the prior two parameters; in a sense, d is a surrogate for the relative "attention paid" to prior performance, as noted in the Code 2 example.
Goal adaptation for Inventory is expressed in terms of inventory carry-over from last period and its relation to the excess limit on inventory, a limit above which the organization begins to bear undesirable costs for inventory. Goal adaptation for Production is expressed in terms of altering an initial proposed inventory level based on an internal (to the production coalition) projection on sales, and two production smoothing bounds: an upper production limit, and a lower production limit. These are noted in the Code 5 example.
Adaptation in Attention Rules. The attention parameters (d) for adjusting the MarketShare goal, Profit goal, Sales goal and price are not fixed, but also change depending on firm and environmental conditions. How each attention d-parameter changes is defined by the particular d-adaptation rule. The form and amount of relative attention varies according to specific criteria and the routines enable adaptation within specific ranges.
Regardless, they are all handled about the same: if the goal is exceeded, then the attention parameter is shifted to give more weight to the recent successful value; if the goal is not achieved, the firm learns to reduce attention (weight) to recent success. Cyert and March refer to these as "first-level" adaptations in the model.
In the Code. In the prior example of Code 2, the attentional shifting for the Profit Goal was illustrated (for β 1 ). The C-M model also includes fixed parameters that affect the rate of adaptation. Cyert and March refer to these as handling "second-level" adaptations or "learning" in the model. Most adjustments are based on whether aspirations are met (increasing the rate) or not (decreasing the rate). These are generally paired with the attentional adjustments.
In the Code. For example, consider the adjustments to the Sales goal (Code 7). The attentional parameter γ 1 is increased or decreased by the adjustment parameter η (which, in the original version of the model, was always constant).
We can also reexamine the example of the Profit goal revision (Code 2, also partially shown in the GATE example, Code 1). We can examine an expanded version of the routine that handles this adjustment (Code 8). Here there was a second attentional parameter (β 2 ) that determined how attention should be handled when the Profit goal is not achieved. It is adjusted based on an examination (via memory) of what type of procedure (i.e., the general search routine) the firm previously engaged.
Adaptation in Search Rules. In the model, problem motivated search is search for an organizational decision. As previously noted, the search space for alternatives (i.e., the specific Search routine noted in the Code 6 example) is well defined in the model and is held constant under the time frame considered. Consequently, the rules themselves are not altered, but the likelihood of their engagement is altered. The search adaptation mechanism is simple: the order of the alternatives is modified as failed strategies are moved to the bottom of the stack. The search routine moves down the list (on subsequent engagements)
if Search was done last time then if ProfitGoal was reduced then
until either a profit goal is achieved, or the pressure (from the sales routines) for a price cut is removed.
In the Code. It is interesting to note that the Search routine is engaged almost as a "last resort" in the pricing decision and in response to an emergency price attention signal.
However, it is modified in the Market Share routine (see Code 3) as described above.
Organizational Memory
In the C-M, there are explicit components addressing organizational memory of parameter values and of particular events, some of which have been explained or alluded to in the prior discussions. Two primary extended memories (i.e., beyond the immediately preceding period) for key parameter values are used for each firm: the firm's own production goal history, and the competitor's price history. Each firm has a memory of its proposed production levels over the prior p periods. The firm uses this information to assist in production smoothing when determining aspiration levels for the upper and lower proposed production limits. Each firm also has a memory of the prices charged by its competitor for the last Φ periods. This is used in monitoring competitor's recent and long run price changes affecting the firm's price level decision.
The C-M also includes memories of events situated in the context of specific routines. More than simple lagged parameter values, this type of memory represents lagged information regarding prior decisions for the particular decision making routine. For example, there is a particular memory retained in some of the price decision routines regarding the firm's recent decisions on price and their subsequent effect. Table 4 shows several examples of how goals, memory for events, and their purposes appear in C-M.
Insert Table 4 about here
Conclusion
In this paper we examined some of the rich history and context of the academic environment at GSIA. At the time, it was a remarkable period for intellectual seeding and growth of many areas -artificial intelligence, computational economics, experimental economics, computational organizational modeling, and social simulations -all within a general concept of "design" (which would be an organizing theme at Carnegie Tech to this day). ABTOF is a coherent, rich source of interrelated concepts explaining many aspects of firm behavior. C-M represents instantiations of that theory in terms of code. In this paper we explored how the verbal articulations of elements of a theory were translated into fragments of code that were situated in an operational model of a duopoly. What was its effect? From a theory standpoint, ABTOF has a well-established citation record in leading journals (Engwall & Danell, 2002) . Most organizational students know of the work and may have even read most of it. However, there is a less clear influence that has not been examined. This is not the influence of the theory, but rather the influence of the methodcomputer simulation in the organizational sciences.
Our own cursory examination of the citations reveals that only a small fraction (less than 1%) actually resulted in derivative simulations. Professor Cyert did express his concerns over this issue. Why did it not "catch on" in organizational studies? In 1965 they were essentially defining routines, meta-routines, organizational learning, organizational memory, organizational attention, communication structures, and doing computational experiments.
We can be speculative at best and certainly agree there may be many explanations and space precludes an in-depth exposition. Consider the obvious: at the time computers (as suggested in the footnote 9) were new, difficult to use, extremely expensive, and few faculties could teach the subject. However, times have indeed changed. Computers are many times more powerful, easier to use, and a fraction of the cost; furthermore, every university has resources for teaching programming. How many organizational science programs currently teach computational modeling as a core method? Table 4 . Examples of types of organizational memory and the purpose in C-M
CONTEXTS EVENT MEMORY PURPOSE Production Goal
How did aspiration levels for proposed production compare to upper and lower production goal limits over the past p periods?
Knowledge of both immediate and longer term past events influences not only upper and lower production limit aspiration levels, but also results in change to slack levels.
